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The critique of the equation and the phenomenology of production 
Frederick H. Pitts, University of Bath 
Review of 
Representing ‘Capital’: A Reading of Volume One.  
Fredric Jameson 
London: Verso 
Abstract: 
In Representing Capital, Fredric Jameson distinguishes two stages of inquiry present within 
the Marx’s magnum opus. The first is the critique of the equation. The second is the 
phenomenology of production. The distinction suggests compelling methodological 
applications. This review explores some implications for the analysis of capitalist social 
relations. 
Paper: 
In his recent book on Marx's Capital1 Fredric Jameson distinguishes two stages of inquiry 
present within the earlier work. The first is the critique of the equation. The second is the 
phenomenology of production. The distinction suggests compelling methodological 
applications. This review explores some implications for the analysis of capitalist social 
relations. 
Seen in the context of his recent work, Representing Capital marks both a continuation and 
the resolution of an absence. It is the third in what is so far a triumvirate of direct 
engagements with the dialectic in its manifold representations.2 
Valences of the Dialectic examined the dialectical method of a plethora of proponents save 
for that of Marx himself. Jameson noted that this was like having ‘Hamlet without the 
prince’.3 The close reading of Marx given in this instalment rectifies matters somewhat. 
Jameson is at pains to emphasise the dialectical status of Capital, taken both as the sum of 
its parts and as the parts themselves.  
In Valences, it is suggested that the dialectic applies itself where incommensurability 
appears. Jameson carries this insight forward here. A large portion of the book develops a 
critique of the ‘mathematical abstraction’ by which valorisation operates in capitalist 
society. It focuses upon the incongruity of the abstraction of a smooth, homogeneous space 
of equality and exchange from distinct qualities.  
                                                          
1
 Marx 1990 
2
 Jameson 2010a and 2010b 
3
 ibid., n. 68, pp. 69-70 
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In this sense, Jameson operates in the context of the ‘dilemma of incommensurability’ that 
he highlights in Valences.4 Incommensurability necessitates the appearance of the dialectic 
in some form. It assists in our understanding of how this incommensurability is overcome. 
Jameson uses Marx to interrogate the conditions of commensurability. This centres upon a 
critical reconstruction of the corollaries of commensuration. Such corollaries include 
exchange, equality, equivalence, abstraction, reflection and equilibrium.  
Jameson constructs Representing Capital around his rethinking of the progression of the 
initial volume of Marx's magnum opus. The first chapter deals with Part One of Capital, 
which Jameson sees as an isolatable text centring upon the ‘critique of the equation’. The 
second chapter then deals with the middle and largest swathe of Capital. Jameson sees 
Parts Two to Seven offering a ‘phenomenology of production’ that complements and 
completes the ‘critique of the equation’.  
The third chapter then discusses Part Eight as a separate piece of work comparable to the 
status awarded Part One. Part Eight outlines the preconditions guaranteeing capitalism's 
existence. But this historicising scrutiny also indicates its fragility, and promises the 
possibility of its end.  
The final four shorter chapters cover, respectively, time, space, the dialectic and politics in 
their relation to Capital. These chapters tie together the analyses of Parts One to Eight of 
Capital with a more general series of reflections. The first three chapters of this closing 
quarter place the book within Jameson's contemporary dialectical work.  
The closing chapter carries forward a controversial claim made at the beginning as regards 
Capital's lack of political content.  Representing Capital's theoretical headline lies in the 
claim that Capital is not about politics or labour, but unemployment (p. 2). The first denial 
carries echoes of the historical celebration of Marx’s scientific objectivity. The second 
denial and the conclusion will stoke greater controversy. Understandably, it is this that has 
garnered the most attention in existing responses to the book.5 This focus is not misplaced.  
This review assesses a wider and more insistent project at the heart of Jameson’s reading 
of Marx. Jameson's project rests on his identification of a 'break' in Capital. In examining 
this claim, it is chiefly the first two chapters of Jameson’s book that I will focus on in my 
review. This both circumvents and complements the focus placed upon the rest of 
Representing Capital in the extant reviews issued since its release.   
Jameson suggests that the first three chapters of Capital constitute a standalone section. He 
contends that Subsequent chapters then proceed to plunge deep into the phenomenological 
realm of production. In so doing, Jameson offers much more than a reinterpretation. 
                                                          
4
 ibid., p. 24 
5
 See Kraniauskas 2012, Choat 2012 and MacGregor 2012 for instance 
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Rather, it suggests a methodology of how one might critically approach capital in its 
manifold dimensions. 
Jameson's parsing of Part One from the remainder of Capital speaks to an early 
demarcation made by Althusser. Althusser notoriously recommended that one could skip 
the first three chapters when reading Capital for the first time.6 Those chapters have long 
held a reputation for being the trickiest part of the book. Indeed, Althusser was likely 
reacting to the sheer practicalities of reading groups dwindling in number and waning in 
interest. Premature withdrawal owing to Part One's complexity closed off the material 
most expedient to the class and labour struggles of the time.  
The Althusserian solution to this has left a legacy that work such as Jameson's helps in 
overturning. Jameson's divorce of the first part from the rest of the book is much different 
to Althusser’s. Today, Althusser’s advice seems conspicuous in the context of a significant 
reinvigoration of value theory.7 But what is common to both recently rediscovered or 
newly translated readings and contemporary value-form approaches is their insistence 
upon careful study of the progression of categories in Part One. Present-day debates 
depend upon often divergent close readings of the first three chapters.  
Sometimes, these debates spill over into polemics about just how best to read Marx’s work. 
This is especially pertinent to the anecdotal rise in Capital reading groups since the Great 
Recession. It is to this largely autodidactic context that Althusser’s advice has traditionally 
been addressed. Take the critique of David Harvey's popular online reading group recently 
issued by the London-based collective Critisticuffs.8 The critique is oriented towards the 
relative efficacy of different approaches to the act of reading Marx. The perceived weakness 
of Harvey's approach lies in his elision of key categorical progressions present in the first 
chapter specifically. From these initial oversights stem wider issues. The commitment to an 
ever closer study of these progressions is subject to, and nourishing of, alternative views of 
what is present and possible in the world. Put simply, there are deliberate and ultimately 
political choices at play in how one approaches Capital.   
Jameson contributes to this contested terrain. In separating the first part from the rest of 
the book, Jameson differs from Althusser in endowing it with even greater importance 
rather than less. Jameson has clearly felt it necessary to provoke a return to and serious 
study of the first three chapters at a time that many others entertain the same urge. But, as 
we shall see, Jameson restores the link between the first part and the whole by means of a 
                                                          
6
 Althusser 2001, p. 52. My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for the motivation to exploit the differences between 
Althusser and Jameson on this point. 
7
 This resurgence represents only the latest development in an often dormant arc of Marxian theorisation of which 
stellar English-language examples and overviews include Rubin 1972, the contributions collected in Elson 1979 and 
Heinrich 2012. 
8
 Critisticuffs 2014 
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clever staging of Marx’s method. That which follows Part One is seen as completing the 
foundational work begun in the first three chapters. 
Representing Capital adds its weight to a growing literature that has no truck with the 
Althusserian shortcut. Contemporary readings of Part One reveal labour, value and money 
to be subject to a social relation of considerable abstraction.  The close study of the first 
three chapters counsels against the belief in easy solutions. But the circumnavigation of 
Part One perpetuates age-old difficulties and misunderstandings over what Marx has to say 
about value as a social form. The uncritical and vulgar results have had boring and often 
dangerous consequences.  
Against this background, Jameson’s critique of the mathematical abstraction of capital and 
the social forms it assumes has much to offer. In the patient and considered reading of Part 
One of which Althusser absolved his readers, Jameson captures the complexity of the nexus 
of value, labour and money. 
The ground upon which Jameson stakes his demarcation of Part One from the rest of 
Capital is its bearing of a ‘critique of the equation’. This critique that is both separate from 
and foundational to the remainder of Marx’s complete inquiry. This critique of 
‘mathematical abstraction’ attempts to answer the central riddle of Capital. This consists of 
two questions (pp. 22-23). The first is ‘how can one object be the equivalent of another 
one?’ Jameson suggests that Marx finds his answer to this question in money. For this he 
uses the 'critique of the equation' which occupies the first three chapters of Capital. This 
critique incorporates the discussion of circulation only. It deals in quantities rather than 
qualities, whilst advancing an immanent critique of the categories of the former. 
The second question is ‘how can the capitalist possibly make a profit out of the exchange of 
objects of equal value?’ This question is answered with the theory of exploitation. This 
theory unfolds through a qualitative exploration of the realm of production. It is this 
'phenomenology' which occupies the rest of Capital. The analysis of capitalist categories 
commences in the critique of the equation. It continues via a phenomenology of work 
emphasising quality over quantity. 
Here Jameson renders an important contribution to the contention over how to read 
Capital. By casting Marx as progressing from the critique of the equation to the 
phenomenology of production, Jameson sees the two as continuous and necessary steps in 
a method. 
This division of critique of the equation and the phenomenology of production places 
Jameson in a longer lineage of critical inquiry. Paul Connerton suggests two traditions 
within 'critique', loosely defined. On the one hand we have 'reconstruction', and, on the 
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other, 'criticism'.9 One might think about the two phases of Jameson’s reading- the critique 
of the equation and the phenomenology of production- in these terms. 
Reconstruction reflects ‘on the conditions of possible knowledge’. It establishes the ‘the 
faculties of knowing, speaking and acting.’ The mode in which reality appears to us is 
constituted by human understanding. The object of knowledge thus issues from human 
cognition, using ‘the a priori forms or ‘categories’’ with which we operate.10 
Jameson's 'critique of the equation' (via Marx, of course) falls within this domain. It seeks 
to generate a conceptualisation of how the reality of capitalist valorisation is structured in 
its abstract, social procedure. The critique of the equation is a mode of reconstruction. It 
enunciates the conditions for the mathematical abstraction of value.   
It is complemented in a wider critique by its counterpart, 'criticism'. The ‘criticism’ strand 
of critique contemplates the ‘system of constraints’ produced by human activity. It 
examines the ‘distorting pressures to which individuals, or a group of individuals, or the 
human race as a whole, succumb in their process of self-formation’.11 
So reconstruction attempts to understand a system of rules or regulative modes of conduct 
that are experienced in a specific context. Criticism is much more particular in its focus 
upon individual identity or group identity, placing explicit emphasis on the subject itself. 
Reconstruction explains 'rules which we follow implicitly’. Criticism ‘renders transparent 
what had previously been hidden'.12   
In this sense, Jameson's identification in Marx of a phenomenology of production adds 
criticism to reconstruction. Following the reconstruction of capitalist categories in Part 
One, Marx conducts in Parts Two to Seven a criticism from the standpoint of experience. 
We may see Jameson’s reading of Marx as an attempt to express the possible grounds for a 
reconciliation of reconstruction and criticism. Critique functions here in its reconstructive 
mode as ‘reflection on the conditions of possible knowledge’. It functions in its critical 
mode in ‘the analysis of constraints to which classes of individuals are subject’.13  The so-
called ‘critique of the equation’ corresponds to the first, and the ‘phenomenology of 
production’ to the second. 
We will deal with each in turn. First is the critique of the equation represented by the first 
part of Capital. The association of Capital with a critique of the equation and its 
                                                          
9
 Connerton 1976 
10
 ibid., pp. 17-19 
11
 ibid., p. 18 
12
 ibid., pp. 19-20 
13
 ibid., p. 20 
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mathematical abstraction is not uncontroversial. A sceptical response might point towards 
Marx’s employment of quantitative material to support his arguments.  
But, as Jameson highlights, Marx persistently draws a chiasmic kind of equivalence 
between the two terms of an equation. According to Jameson, Marx ‘undermine[s]’ the 
‘static or synchronic function of the equals sign’. This he does by relativizing each term 
based upon its position in the equation. By comparing two seemingly incomparable things, 
Marx generates a ‘surrealist image’. The image achieves its surreal effect by ‘juxtapos[ing] 
two objects as far from each other as possible’ (p. 24).  
A fine example of this quoted by Jameson is Marx’s equation consisting of ‘one volume of 
Propertius and eight ounces of snuff’.14 Through such flourishes, Marx undermines the 
abstraction upon which equation depends. Marx abstracts from concrete properties so as 
to render absurd the practice by which this abstraction proceeds in society itself. These 
quantitative forays do not represent earnest appeals to mathematics or science. Rather the 
often humorous equations presented by Marx are fragments of an immanent critique of the 
equation itself. 
This critique of the equation revolves around a ‘critique of identity’ grounded in Hegel’s 
dialectic of identity and difference. Jameson suggests that Marx goes much further than 
Hegel in his critique of the equation, composed as it is of four objects, to which we attach a 
fifth.  
1) The first object of Marx’s critique is political economy. Marx questions the 
theorisation of exchange and equivalence in the buying and selling of commodities, 
including labour power. 
2) The second is the ‘equality’ of capitalist individuals free to buy and sell labour. 
This freedom is established through the contract, which draws parity between 
employee and employer. 
3) The third is the equivalence drawn between self-consciousness and 
consciousness. The reflection existing between the two called into question. This 
extends to the idea of artistic reflection between the work of art and the world it 
seeks to represent. 
4) The fourth object of critique is the ‘abstraction involved in equating one concrete 
thing or phenomenon with another’ (pp. 18-19, emphasis added).  
5) One might also add to this Marx’s critique of the idea of equilibrium in classical 
accounts of capitalist economy. This is hinted at but not fully enunciated in 
Jameson’s roll-call of the elements of Marx’s critique of the equation. 
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 Marx 1990, p. 28 
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Marx thus places critical focus upon manifestations of purported identity. The positing of 
identity takes the form of exchange, equivalence, equality, reflection and equilibrium.  
The critique of identity need not result in the uncritical ‘affirmation of differences’ as a 
counterpoint. Rather, equivalence itself presupposes difference as the basis upon which it 
is possible at all (p. 18). In light of this, we may suggest a sixth object of critique upon 
which the preceding five rest. The critique of difference is necessary. Such a critique 
destabilises the foundation without which the positing of identity is neither necessary nor 
possible.  
Identity and difference are mutually implicated within one another. A dialectical critique is 
necessary. This would ‘destablize’ identity and difference by other means than merely the 
latter’s affirmation (p. 18). Indeed, Jameson goes as far as to suggest that the dialectic  
came into being to handle a strange and unparalleled historical situation, namely 
one in which everything is  different and yet remains the same […]. The dialectic is 
then a mode of thinking able to combine the singular and the general in a unique 
way, or better still, to shift gears from the one to the other and back again, to identify 
them in such a way that they remain different. (pp. 133-4) 
Only the dialectic, then, suffices for the study and critique of the equation. A dialectical 
critique addresses itself to the implicated nature of identity and difference. It touches upon 
the foundational character of both identity and difference with reference to equivalence 
itself. Jameson opposes to his interpretation of Capital the ‘anti-identity’ standpoint of 
Adorno. Jameson ascribes to the latter a belief in the ‘primacy of the singular’ and the 
‘unassimilable differences of everything that surrounds us’. This differs from the critique of 
the equation posed by Jameson via Marx (p. 22). The Adornian standpoint isolates 
difference as a positive factor. In so doing, it ignores the dialectical relationship with 
identity that difference immanently entails. 
The affirmation of difference as a counterprinciple to identity may lead to a certain 
circularity. Here, one cannot help to return to equivalence as a means by which difference 
can ordered and organised. Equivalence functions as a Kantian category through which the 
diverse, particular chaos of reality meets with the capacity of perception to grasp it. There 
is of course a temptation to posit this as the result of an immanent practice of the mind. But 
this temptation is resistible with recourse to the complementary treatments of Kant’s 
thought we find in Horkheimer and Sohn-Rethel.15 Their accounts do not situate the 
concepts and categories through which perception grasps the world in eternal faculties of 
human cognition. Rather, they situate them in the system of commodity exchange. 
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 See Horkheimer 1972[1976] (especially pp. 215-6) and Sohn-Rethel 1978 
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Jameson suggests that by inviting the drawing of equivalence, difference lies within the 
dialectic of identity rather than without.  Critique must target the equation. It must address 
the mathematical abstraction by which ‘radically distinct objects' are 'grasped as 
equivalents of one another.’ This opens up upon the critique of the ideological ramifications 
and expressions of the equation. Jameson provides an inexhaustive list of potential subjects 
of extended critique. The critique of the equation threatens the contract, the just price and 
the fair wage. It challenges concepts of equality and equilibrium. It undermines 
epistemological and artistic reflection (pp. 22-23). 
The answer to the question with which a critique of the equation grapples lies in money. It 
is by means of money that ‘one thing can be “the same” as another’. This money achieves 
via its 'crystallisation' of different and specific individual labours in a single social form (p. 
35): 
For money is the crystallization of the contradiction and not its effacement: it now 
renders the contradiction workable; with money we may now inhabit it and live 
among its dualities. Money has not solved the riddle of the equation- how different 
things could possibly be the same- but it has turned that conundrum into coin of the 
realm which will allow us to forget about it and go about our business. (p. 45) 
Money temporarily defers the contradiction of equivalence. Yet it does not fully explain 
how profit can arise from the exchange of equivalents. It does, however, allow one to 
perceive profit in some way. A more orthodox Marxist rendering of this issue surfaces in 
David Harvey’s reading of Capital Volume Two.16  Harvey contends that a commodity is not 
divisible in and of itself. It is not so that one part of the car is profit, another remains as 
capital, another as surplus value etc. The commodity form limits the degree to which you 
can tell the surplus-value and profit produced and realised.  
But, in the money form, Harvey wagers, surplus-value is determinable. ‘You cannot see how 
much surplus-value there was in the commodity until it goes into its monetary form’, 
suggests Harvey.17  This is true enough. But we might go further and claim that the surplus-
value is not there to be discovered or made apparent in the first place. Rather, it is only 
brought into existence in the moment that the object of labour sells as a commodity for 
money.  
Doubtless, in a more subtle sense it is a process that progresses in abstraction over the 
course of the circuit as a whole. But, ultimately, money constitutes rather than reveals value, 
bringing about that which is measured by means of measure itself. Thus, Harvey’s assertion 
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 Marx 1992 
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of the ‘illusory character of money’ with reference to value is open to disputation. Rather, 
the appearance it takes vis-à-vis value is precisely a real appearance. 
Surplus-value is determinable to some extent in the money form. But the latter obscures 
any connection with the realm of production through which the possibility of surplus-value 
obtains. As Harvey asserts, one can no longer perceive from the crystallisation of the 
money-form the acts of production that took place. Abstract labour and its monetary 
appearance are incredulous as regards the commodity's concrete origins. Yet, it is upon the 
basis of concrete particular labour that specific goods and services suggest specific acts of 
consumption. The criterion of use-value is dependent upon the possibility of exchange-
value. Indeed, it owes its existence to the latter. Thus, the practices of production are 
essential to understand how profit is achievable in the context of the exchange of 
equivalents.  
The second question, to remind ourselves, concerned the matter of how can ‘the capitalist 
possibly make a profit out of the exchange of objects of equal value.’ To answer the second 
question, Jameson suggests that we must take a trip into Marx’s ‘hidden abode of 
production’.18 
Beyond the equalising appearance of money guaranteed by the equation, some place other 
than circulation must be sought. Here, we can discover how profit is possible in this context 
of equivalence. Jameson reads Marx as departing from the presentation of circulation given 
in the first part of Capital to proceed to the ‘hidden abode. Here, Marx restates the qualities 
of the work that takes place rather than the quantities in which this work is abstracted 
from in exchange. Jameson suggests that the critique of the equation thereby culminates in 
a phenomenological undertaking. This destabilises the equation further by enunciating the 
experiences of those employed in the realm of production. 
The realm of pure quantity quashes qualitative considerations. Marx highlights the 
outcome whereby ‘[f]rom the taste of wheat it is not possible to tell who produced it, a 
Russian serf, a French peasant or an English capitalist’. But, Marx writes, ‘[d]igging gold, 
mining iron, cultivating wheat and weaving silk are qualitatively different kinds of 
labour’.19  It is precisely the specificity of all labour in its concrete complexion that invites 
its abstraction. Abstract labour has no existence save a purely conceptual and retrospective 
one in the service of exchange. There is only concrete labour in its particular, qualitative 
manifestation. Abstract labour does not ‘take place’ at all. It takes a solely ideal form in the 
devices and practices of rationalisation, standardisation and time management. These 
facilitate the greater potential of the future abstraction of labour. They give an anticipatory 
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glimpse of the exchange abstraction as its precondition coheres. But abstract labour 
appears fully only in exchange. 
The different qualities of specific labours are ‘repressed from the quantitative, or better 
still, […] fall out of its frame, remain undetected on its screens of measurement’ (p. 25). In 
this they service the abstractive apparatus of the equation.  Qualities are thus subordinated 
to the abstract movement of value. Jameson implies that restating these qualities enables 
the completion of the critique of the equation.  The critique begins with the answering of 
the first question of Capital’s riddle. It then proceeds from this to answer the second. 
We began by reflecting upon the roles played by reconstruction and criticism in Jameson’s 
interpretation of Marx’s dual critique. Conceptualising these two aspects as concurrent 
stages of a critical method allows an appreciation of the scope and scale of Jameson’s 
ambition. It places the work in a lineage including earlier proponents of the reconciliation 
of reconstruction and criticism, such as the Frankfurt School.  
We may say that the critique of the equation reconstructs the conditions and 
characteristics of those five (or six) elements identified above. The criticism of these 
conditions restates the suppressed qualitative content of the work performed. This 
proceeds through the phenomenological account of experience. There are clear practical 
implications in this. One group who stand to profit are social science researchers interested 
in the investigation of life and work under capital. Representing Capital has significant 
exegetical ramifications. To the uninitiated, it may seem an imposing work of Marxology. 
But, more pressingly, this book derives from Marx a methodological model by which critical 
social inquiry into capitalist forms can proceed. 
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